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Article 4

Robart v. State of Alaska: A New
Interpretation for Copyrightable Subject

Matter?
By Jessica Miedema*

I. Introduction
Every year millions of people buy commemorative and
souvenir items depicting state seals. However, after the decision
handed down in Robart v. Alaska, such items may no longer be as
readily available.' In the wake of the Robart decision, manufacturers
of souvenir items could be held criminally liable for using a state seal
on their products, depending on where the items are produced or
sold.2 There is little legal precedent which addresses whether a state
can prohibit the use of its state seal. A number of earlier cases that
challenged a state's right to regulate the use of it's seal-brought
under trademark law-upheld state protectionist statutes; however a
more recent case decided under copyright law held that the state
statutes were preempted. 3
In Robart, the court held that the Alaska state seal was not
copyrightable subject matter, and was not protected by the federal
copyright laws.4 The court stated that the Copyright Act of 1976 did
not preempt Alaska's state statute, which prohibited use of the state
seal for commercial purposes without permission from the state's
J.D. candidate, May 2006, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
in Sociology, 2002, Valparaiso University. The author would like to thank her
husband, family, and friends for their love, patience, and support.
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'

Robart v. Alaska, 82 P.3d 787 (Alaska 2004).

2

Id.

See Commw. v. R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. 71 (Mass. 1905) and In Re
Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. 173 (D.C. 1906) (stating that under trademark law
a state can prohibit the use of the state seal); See also Bicentennial Comm'n v. Olde
Bradford Co., 365 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1976) (holding that under copyright law a state
cannot prohibit the use of a state seal that is in the public domain).
4 Robart, 82 P.3d at 791.
3
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Lieutenant Governor.5 As a result of the Robart case, state courts are
now in disagreement as to whether a state seal is copyrightable
subject matter. 6 Moreover, the Copyright Act of 1976 was revised by
Congress to achieve uniformity and predictability of copyright rights,
and the Robart holding conflicts with that purpose.7 In essence, the
Robart court has given the State of Alaska an exclusive property right
in it's state seal. In addition, this right goes against the fundamental
principles of copyright law, as one cannot receive a copyright for
material that was already
in the public domain, much less an
8
exclusive property right.
This article will first discuss the sections of federal copyright
law that address copyrightable subject matter and other pertinent
provisions of the Copyright Act. Part II discusses three pre-Robart
cases 9 that illustrate how courts have treated state seals in the past.
Part III discusses the holding in Robart and the denial of certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court in this case. Part IV analyzes
the court's decision in Robart and its inconsistency with copyright
law. This part also addresses any alternative solutions to the state seal
issue, such as trademark law or an intervention by Congress. Part V
discusses the impact of this holding on copyright law, and both
individuals and private entities who wish to use the state seal for
commercial purposes. Finally, this article concludes by discussing the
concerns surrounding the Robart decision.

II. The History of State Seals as Copyrightable Subject
Matter
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
To understand whether or not a state seal is copyrightable
subject matter, one must look to the foundation of the Copyright Act.
The Constitution granted Congress the right to "promote the progress
5 Robart, 82 P.3d at 793.
6 Brief for Appellant at 19, Robart v. Alaska, 82 P.3d 787 (Alaska 2004) (No.
04-215).
7 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5664.
8 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
9 R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 71; Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at
173; Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 172.
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of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."' 0 The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790 and was
revised every forty years until 1909.11 The most recent Copyright Act
was wholly amended in 1976,
although it remains fundamentally the
2
same as the 1909 version.'
The gateway to copyright protection begins with Section 102
of the Copyright Act. This section defines copyrightable subject
matter as an "original work of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression."1 3 This definition can be broken down into
three areas: originality, works of authorship, and works being fixed in
any tangible medium of expression. 14 First, for a work to be original
it must be independently created and have at least a minimal level of
creativity.' 5 To fulfill the minimal level of creativity requirement a
work must not be so mechanical or routine that it lacks any trace of
ingenuity.' 6 Second, Section 102 provides a non-exhaustive list of
categories that would be considered works of authorship.17 These
categories include literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and architectural works.18 The use of the word "include"
makes clear that the listing is illustrative and inclusive in nature. 19
Moreover, categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope 20of original
works of authorship that the bill is intended to protect. Third, a
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when it is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,

'o U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8 cl. 8.

1 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5660.
12 id.
13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
14 id.

15 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
16 Id.

17 17 U.S.C. § 102.
18 Id.
19

H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5666.
20

,j
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reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration. 21
One main category provided by the statute is one of pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, 22 which is broadly defined as: "two
dimensional and three dimensional works of fine, graphic, and
applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes,
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans. 23
Section 105 places all federal government works in the public
domain and therefore not available for copyright protection. 24 A work
of the United States government is a work prepared by an officer or
employee of the United States government as part of that person's
official duties. 25 Consequently, materials created by government
employees cannot secure a copyright. 26 In addition, the use of federal
government works does not mean that a work falling within this
definition is the property of the United States government. 27
However, in 1966 Congress passed a statute that protects such federal
symbols as the great seal of the United States and the seals of the
executive and legislative branches from being used without express
permission. 28 While the legislative history is silent as to why this
statute was enacted, one could infer Congress' action as an indication
that it felt the federal symbols were left unprotected by copyright law
and needed specific protection.29 With no legislative comment
regarding state seals and symbols, one could find that Congress did
not intend toprohibit states from protecting seals that represent state
sovereignty.W However, the statute could also be interpreted as
prohibiting protection because Congress did not expressly mention

21

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

22

Id. at § 102.

23

Id. at § 101.

24

Id. at § 105.

25 Id.
26

at § 101.

H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5673.
27
28
29

Id. at 59.
18 U.S.C. § 713(a) (1997).
Robart, 82 P.3d at 793.

30 Id.
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state seals and symbols. 3 'Once a work is deemed copyrightable
subject matter and is, therefore, protected under the Copyright Act,
Section 106 gives the copyright owner a bundle of rights that can be
used as the owner wishes. 3 Among these rights are the rights of
reproduction, derivation, distribution, and display.33 Therefore, the
owner of a valid copyright has the right to decide who gets this
bundle of rights34 by licensing out each right to either the same or
separate parties.

Finally, Section 301 of the Copyright Act states that any
rights granted by Section 106 that "are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject mater of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103... are governed exclusively by
this title."3 Moreover, Section 301(b)(1) states that
nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any state with respect
to subject matter that does not come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression. 36
If a work is not copyrightable subject matter, or is not fixed in a
medium of expression, the Copyright
Act does not preempt any state
37
statute which would govern.
B. History of State Seal Cases in the State Courts
Only three cases-two from the early 1900's and one from
1976-have addressed the issue of whether a state can prohibit the
use of its seal. 38 In the two earlier cases, the state courts relied on
trademark law to solve the problem of allowing states to prohibit

3
32

Brief for Appellant at 28, Robart (No. 04-215).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).

33 Id.

3 id.
35 Id.

§ 301.

36 id.

37 Copyright
38

Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).

R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 71 and Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at

173 (decided in 1905 and 1906 respectively); Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at. 172.
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individuals and private entities alike from using the state seal-the
sovereign symbol of the state-for commercial purposes.39
Trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act, which
describes a registered trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, which is used by a person or
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce. 40 A
trademark must also identify and distinguish this product from other
goods. 4 1 This includes a unique product from those manufactured or
sold by others and indicates the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.42 While trademarks do not give one an exclusive
right to use a certain word or symbol, the rationale behind trademarks
is one of reducing consumer confusion and protecting companies'
goodwill.4 3

In Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manufacturing Co., the
defendant used the Massachusetts' seal and arms on his labels after
the Massachusetts' statute's grace period expired.44 The statute read
as follows: "No person or private corporation shall use the arms or
the great seal of the commonwealth, nor any representation thereof,
for any advertising or commercial purpose whatever. ' ' 5 The court
relied on trademark law as a basis for Massachusetts' claim.46 The
court stated that a trademark can be a name, or any arrangement of
words, lines, figures that designate goods of a particular kind
manufactured by the trademark holder as long as no other person has
an equal right to use.4 7 The court found that the

state of

Massachusetts designed the state seal and the defendant copied it
onto his labels to use for his business. 48 This gave both parties an
equal right to use the mark and neither party could claim a trademark

39See R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 72; See Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App.

D.C. at 173.
40 The Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
41Id.
42

Id.

43

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

44 R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 71.
45Id.
46 id.
47 Id.
48

Id. at 72.
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to it.4 9

The court noted that since the act in question was within the
power of the Massachusetts' state legislature and it did not come into
conflict with the U.S. Constitution, the state could forbid the use of
the seal for any advertising or commercial purposes. 50 Therefore, the
defendant had no rights to a trademark and was guilty of violating the
Massachusetts' state statute.51
Moreover, in the In Re Cahn, Belt, & Company case, the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that a mark
simulating the arms or seal of a state, even with "certain additions or
variations" to the state seal when used for commercial purposes, is
not entitled to registration under the Trademark Act.52 In this action,
Cahn, Belt, & Company applied for a trademark for the mark used
upon its whiskey.
This mark was described as "a pictorial
representation of the arms and seal of the State of Maryland, with
certain additions or variations." 54 The court stated that Section 5 of
the Trademark Act clearly prohibited trademark use for any mark that
consisted of the coat of arms, other insignia of the United States or of
any state, provided that the applicant did not have actual and
exclusive use of the trademark for ten years prior to the enactment of
Section 5.5 The court also held that
56 registering a public insignia of a
policy.
public
to
contrary
was
state
Because the mark in this case consisted of the coat of arms of
Maryland, it fell within the public insignia description.57 Although
the company had actual use of the trademark, it never possessed
exclusive use of the mark, and therefore, the company could not have

49 R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 72.
50 id.
51 Id.
52

See generally Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at 173 (holding that acquiring

an exclusive property right in the state's coat of arms is not allowed by a person or
entity).
53 Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at 173.
54 id.
55 Id.at 172; See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (taking the earlier Section 5 of the
Trademark Act in its entirety and converting it to Section 1052 of the current
Trademark Act).
56 Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at 173.

57 Id.
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acquired the property right in the mark required by Section 5.58 The
Cahn, Belt & Co. case clearly illustrates that a private entity or
individual cannot invoke trademark law as a means by which to use a
state seal for commercial purposes against a state's wishes because it
is unlikely that the private entit or individual ever had exclusive use
the state's seal or coat of arms.
C. The Pennsylvania Decision: State Seals Protected
While the two cases discussed in Part II.B, supra, were
decided only under trademark law, the more recent legal precedent of
Bicentennial Commission v. Olde Bradford Co. analyzes state seal

rights in the context of both trademark and copyright laws. 60 Until
recently, Olde Bradford Co. was the only reported case that directly
addressed whether the Copyright Act preempted a state seal
protectionist statute.6 ' While trademark law seemed to be a dead-end
for individuals and private entities that wished to use state seals for
commercial purposes, the court in Olde Bradford Co. established that
copyright law was a viable solution to this problem. 62 The Olde
Bradford Company had, both before and after the state of
Pennsylvania registered it's seal as a service mark, manufactured
items bearing a similarity to the state's seal.63 These products were
similar or nearly identical to the items manufactured by Wilton, a
competitor, who had paid Pennsylvania for permission to use the
state's seal.64 The Commission alleged that the Olde Bradford
Company had violated Pennsylvania's Bicentennial Act of 1975,
which states:
No person, partnership, corporation or other entity, except
as authorized by the commission, shall use, manufacture,
sell, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, colorably imitate or
58

Cahn, Belt & Co., 27 App. D.C. at 173.

59 See generally id. (showing that trademark law does not protect state seals
for commercial purposes).
60

Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 174-75.

61

Brief for Appellant at 19, Robart (No. 04-215).

62

See generally Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 174-75 (putting state seals in

the public domain and making the state seal copyrightable subject matter under the
Copyright Act).
63 Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 175.

6 Id. at 174-75.

2005]

New Interpretationfor Copyrightable Subject Matter

317

otherwise use in a manner likely to cause confusion, to
cause mistake or to deceive, any mark adopted by the
commission, or any item bearing such mark, or apply any
such mark to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles, or advertisements intended to be used upon, or
in connection with, the manufacture, sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services.65
The court determined that Section (b) of the Bicentennial Act
included elements of both copyright law and trademark law. 66 The
Act prohibited any unauthorized reproduction, which references
copyright law and also banned use in a manner likely to cause
confusion, which references trademark law. 67 However, the court
found that the dominant intent of the Act was to prohibit the mere
68
unauthorized production of the state of Pennsylvania's marks.
Although the Act's language tracked trademark laws, it did not
specify the parties to be protected or the type of confusion to be
avoided. 69 Federal copyright law, which also prohibited the mere
unauthorized production of works, preempted the state statute, and
therefore70 the company could copy any work already in the public
domain.

1I1. Robart: The Divergence from Prior Case Law
In Robart v. Alaska, the state of Alaska brought charges
against Scott Robart for his attempt to sell a medallion featuring the
state seal in a state sponsored show. 71 In 1996, Robart, a
businessman, was invited by an employee of the State Department of
Commerce and Economic Development to participate in a show on
the QVC home shopping network.72 This show was to feature
consumer-made products from Alaska and would be televised

65

Id. at 177.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 177.

69

id.

70

Id. at 177-78.

71 Robart, 82 P.3d at 790.
72

Id. at 789.
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nationally.73 He wanted to use the state seal on a medallion
commemorating 100th anniversary of the 1897 Alaska gold rush.
The state seal of Alaska consists of an arrangement of pictures that
includes forests, fish, seals, railroads and other symbols that represent
the state.75 Before producing the medallion, Robart investigated the
state's requirements for using the seal and discovered that Alaska law
allowed an individual to use the state seal if he obtained the
permission of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor.7 6 Robart then
faxed his written request for permission to use the state seal to the
Office of the Alaska Lieutenant Governor. 77 Despite repeated
attempts to obtain permission, Robart never received a response to
his requests.78 Robart also faxed two requests to the Alaska Office 79of
the Governor, but the Governor's office also failed to reply to him.
Although he never obtained the Lieutenant Governor's
permission to use the seal, Robart decided to use the state seal based
on a state employee's encouragement to showcase his product on the
QVC special. 80 Moreover, because Robart had not received a
response from any government office, he reasoned that the statute
81
would not be an obstacle to showcasing his product on the show.
Once the design of the product was submitted to the Department of
Commerce and Economic Development, the state department did not
contact Robart to inquire whether he had permission to use the state
seal. 82 In fact, the Governor of Alaska sent a letter to Robart
congratulating him for his product's appearance on the upcoming
QVC broadcast.83
When the medallion appeared on the show, the Lieutenant
Governor's chief of staff saw the state seal on the product and
73 Robart, 82 P.3d at 789.
74 id.
75 Brief for Appellant at 25, Robart (No. 04-215).
76 Robart, 82 P.3d at 789; See also, ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (2004)
(prohibiting use of state seal without permission and outlining punishments).
77 Robart, 82 P.3d at 789.
78

Id.

79 Id.
80

id.

81 Id.
82

Robart, 82 P.3d at 789.

83

id.
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wondered whether Robart had permission to use the symbol. 84 When
it was revealed that Robart did not have permission, the Governor
sent Robart a cease and desist letter and enclosed a copy of the
statute. 85 On August 6, 1997, two months after Robart had received
the Governor's letter, an Alaskan state trooper posed as a buyer and
purchased two medallions from Robart. 86 The state then charged
Robart with using the state seal for commercial purposes without the
written permission of the lieutenant governor in violation of Alaska
statute 44.09.015.87
Robart made a motion to dismiss the charged based on the
grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free
speech. 88 The district court agreed with Robart and dismissed the
case. 89 The State of Alaska appealed. 9° The Alaska Supreme Court
concluded that commercial use of the state seal was not protected
speech and reversed the district court's ruling. 9' Robart petitioned the
court for a hearing and it was granted with the request to brief
whether federal copyright law preempted the statute.92 However, after
arguments had been heard, the court dismissed the petition as
improvidently granted.93 The case returned to the district court and
Robart again made a motion to dismiss the charged based on federal
copyright preemption grounds.94 The district court denied Robart's
motion and he appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, who decided to
hear his case.95
Robart argued before the Alaska Supreme Court that federal
copyright laws preempted the state statute because under Section 102
84 Id.
85

id.

86

Id. at 790.

87 Robart, 82 P.3d at 790; See also ALASKA STAT § 44.09.015(a) (Michie
2004) (prohibiting the use of the state seal without written permission from the
lieutenant governor).
88 Robart, 82 P.3d at 790.
89 Id.
90 Id.

91 Id.
92

Id.

9' Robart, 82 P.3d at 790.
94 id.
95 Id.
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of the Copyright Act, the state seal was copyrightable subject
matter.96 He also argued that the state seal was in the public domain
and could be freely used by the public. 97 Robart stated in his brief
that Alaska could not pass its own statute to provide the same
protections given under the federal Copyright Act because the federal
law preempts all other state laws. 98 The state of Alaska's position was
that the Copyright Act does not preempt the statute, because it falls
within the preemption exceptions listed in Section 301(b) of the
Act. 99 Under this section copyright law does not preempt state law
that addresses rights or remedies that do not come within
copyrightable subject matter as set out in Section 102.100 The state
argues that a state seal, because it is the symbol of a sovereign, is not
a type of work that comes within copyrightable subject matter and as
a result falls within one the preemption exception of Section
301(b).' 0°
The Alaska Supreme Court held that federal copyright law
does not preempt the Alaska statute limiting the commercial use of
the state seal because states have the power to protect symbols of
their sovereignty as evidenced by earliest trademark cases on this
issue. 102 The court favorably weighed the state's argument as more
accurate and held that a state seal is the symbol of a sovereign
entity. 0 3 Thus, it is not the type of work that comes within the
subject matter of the copyright laws.' 0 4 The court reasoned that the
federal copyright laws do not expressly include state seals as
copyrightable subject matter, and the state seal would fall within the
preemption exceptions listed in Section 301(b) of the Copyright
Act.'0 Therefore, federal copyright law could not preempt the

Robart, 82 P.3d at 790; See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (listing an
inclusive and non exhaustive list of copyrightable subject matter).
97 Robart, 82 P.3d at 791.
96

98

Id.

99 Id.
'0o

Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2000).

'0'

Robart, 82 P.3d at 791.
Id.

102

103
104

Id.
Robart, 82 P.3d at 791.

105 Id.
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statute. 106
Robart appealed the decision by the Alaska Supreme Court to
the United States Supreme Court. 10 7 Even though a state conflict
exists on the issue of whether a state seal protectionist statute is
preempted by federal copyright law, on October 14, 2004, the
Supreme Court denied Robart's writ of certiorari.10 8 Therefore, a
divergence in state case law exists: the Alaska decision upholding
state seal protectionist statutes, or the Pennsylvanian decision which
prohibits those very same statutes.

IV.Why the Robart Case was Wrongly Decided
A. Robart is Irreconcilable With Olde Bradford
Olde Bradford and Robart are the only two reported cases that
address whether the Copyright Act preempts a state seal protectionist
statute. °9 As discussed in Part II.C, Olde Bradford takes the position
that a state seal is copyrightable subject matter and is protected under
the federal copyright laws. 1° Consequently, those laws preempted
the state statute, which prohibited the commercial use of the state
seal. 1 However, the high court of Alaska did not acknowledge Olde
Bradford's relevance in the Robart decision. The only mention of
Olde Bradford was in a footnote that stated: "Although the laws
governing copyrights and trademarks may overlap as applied to a
single item, they are intended to grant quite different forms of
protection to their holders."'1 2 This quote does not convey the
relevant holding of Olde Bradford, which is that copyright law did
preempt the state seal statute because the dominant intent of the
Bicentennial Act was to prohibit, as does the federal copyright law,
the mere unauthorized production of the Pennsylvania commission's

106 Id.

'07

Robart, 82 P.3d 787, petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 1835374 (U.S. Aug.

12, 2004) (No. 04-215).
108 Robart v. Alaska, 125 S. Ct. 310, 310 (2004).
109

See generally Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 178 (stating the Bicentennial

Act was preempted by federal copyright law).
110 Id. at 178.
Ill Id.
112 Robart, 82

P.3d at 792 n.30.
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marks. 113
In fact, the court also stated "we cannot find a single federal
or state case discussing the application of federal copyright law on
laws protecting state seals."
This is a blatant disregard of the
Pennsylvania court and its ruling in Olde Bradford Co. The Alaska
court instead decided
to look at earlier legal precedent, which focused
1 15
on trademark law.
State courts faced with the issue of whether a state seal statute
is preempted have two entirely different positions to consider." 6 This
is contrary to Congress' objectives of a single uniform federal system7
and promotion of works of authorship for the 1976 Copyright Act. 1
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution was to promote national uniformity and to avoid the
practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights
under differing laws of the various states.' 18 National uniformity in
the copyright arena avoids the practical difficulties of determining
and enforcing an author's rights under the differing state laws and in
the separate courts of the various states.119 A single uniform federal
system for copyright protection is more essential now than ever as
different areas and technology are becoming apparent in the
copyright field.' 20 With the development of communications through
technology, the concept of publication has become artificial and
obscure. ' 2' Since the courts have given various interpretations of
"publication," some of them radically different, Congress enacted the

3
114

Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 177.
Id. at 792.

115 Id.

at 791-92.

116 See

Robart, 82 P.3d at 793 (holding the Copyright Act does not preempt

the Alaska state seal statute); See also Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 177 (holding
the Copyright Act does preempt the Pennsylvania state statute).
117 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5745 (stating Congress' goals of national uniformity and protecting
consumer confusion).
"8 Brief for Appellant at 21, Robart (No. 04-215); H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 129
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745.
119 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5745 (discussing how important national uniformity was in enacting the
Copyright Act).
120 See id.
121

See id. at 130.
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22

1976 Copyright Act to help clear up this chaotic situation.'
Moreover, this ruling completely affects the implementation

of similar state statutes. Twenty-five states have a statute that
prohibits unauthorized commercial use of their state seal by: (1)

expressly prohibiting unauthorized use for commercial purposes; (2)
prohibiting all non-governmental uses; (3) allowing educational or
commemorative uses only with prior approval; ir (4) imposin
restrictions on private party use of reproductions of the state seal.l 2
These states do not know which decision their courts will look to
follow or how to advise individuals and private entities on how to
read the state seal statutes. This example shows precisely the kind of
confusion
Congress wanted to avoid when it drafted the Copyright
24
Act. 1

B. State Seals As Copyrightable Subject Matter?
In order to qualify as "subject matter" under Section 102 of
the Copyright Act, a state seal must be an original work of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
There is a very low
threshold of creativity required to satisfy the originality requirement,
"as even a slight amount will suffice." 1 26 The state seal of Alaska is
sufficiently creative to satisfy the originality requirement because it
has united pictures of forests, fish, seals, railroads and other symbols
122

See id.

123

See Brief for Appellant at 20, Robart (No. 04-215); ALA. CODE § 13A-10-

13(a) (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (Michie 2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. §
41.130 (2004); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 402(a) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-106a
(2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2306(b) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 15.03(3)
(West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-3-31, 50-3-8 (2002); HAw. REV. STAT. § 5-6
(2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/5 and 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/1 (2004); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §204 (2003); MICH. COM. LAWS § 750.245 (2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 235.010(4) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:9-a (2003); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:2-9 (2004); N.Y. STATE LAW § 74 (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 54-02-01(2)(d) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5.10 (West 2004); OR. REV.
STAT. § 186.023 (2003); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-15-4 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3857-45 (LAW. Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§1-6-3.1, 1-6-3.2 (Michie
2003); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.08(b) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 7.131.1 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§43.04.030, 43.04.040 (2004).
124 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5745 (discussing apparent need for limiting confusion between state
statutes).
1215 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
126 Feist Publ'ns, Inc.,

499 U.S. at 345.
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that are part of Alaska's proud state history. 27 In addition, the seal is
also a work of authorship as it falls squarely within the pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works category listed in Section 102.128 The
state seal can be either a two or three-dimensional work of fine,
graphic or applied art, and therefore fits into this overall sculptural
category. 129 Even if the state seal did not fit into this category, the list
in Section 102 is not exhaustive and many other objects not listed
might be considered copyrightable subject matter as long as it meets
the other requirements set forth under Sections 101, 102 and 103.131
Last, the state seal is fixed in a tangible
1 31 form of expression as it is in
case.
this
in
medallion
a
of
form
the
C. An Incorrect Interpretation of the Copyright Act Lead to the
Robart Decision
The Robart court concluded that because Congress did not
mention state seals in Section 102 when defining copyrightable
subject matter, it did not intend to preempt state seal protectionist
statutes.13 2 This interpretation is not only inconsistent, but conflicts
with the statutory definition of copyrightable subject matter.1 33 In
Section 102, Congress set forth a list of categories that fell within
copyright protection.' 34 The only obstacle to overcome for state seals
to be copyrightable subject matter is for the seal to fall into one of the
listed categories, 135 and Alaska's state seal falls within the pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works category.
The court's reasoning in Robart, however, works against its
analysis. 136 In Section 105 of the Copyright Act, Congress expressly
127

Appellant's Brief at 25, Robart (No. 04-215).

128

17 U.S.C. § 102.

129

Id. at § 101.

130

H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5665.
131See Robart, 82 P.3d at 789 (stating that Robart attached the state seal on a
medallion for the QVC show).
112 See id. (stating that Congress cannot be said to have preempted an area
traditionally occupied by states when it remains silent on the issue at debate).
133Appellant's Brief at 27-8, Robart (No. 04-215).
134 17 U.S.C. § 102.
135 id.

136 See Appellant's Brief at 28, Robart (No. 04-215) (stating that the court's
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excludes "any work of the United States Government" from
copyrightable subject matter.137 Nowhere does it mention state seals
or works of state governments; analyzing the Act by express
inclusion or exclusion leads to a conclusion that only the works of the
138
United States of America are protected under this specific statute.
In addition, this would be the most appropriate place to mention
whether state seals and symbols fall under copyright protection, as it
is a specific prohibition section. Section 102 would be the least
suitable place to discuss state seals because it is a general section of
all includable copyrightable subject matter which are set forth in a
non-exhaustive list.139
The Robart court also explains that before a state area can be
preempted by federal law, "congressional intent to supersede state
laws must be clear and manifest."' 40 The court notes that because
federal copyright law is silent on the issue of state seals, Congress
has not firmly rooted itself into this area of copyright law. 14 1 This
interpretation is lacking as Congress has imminently placed itself in
every area of copyright law, as demonstrated by the broad regulation
of the Copyright Act itself. 142 In fact, the congressional notes for
Section 301 of the Copyright Act explain that:
The intent is to preempt and abolish any rights under the
common law or statutes of a state that are equivalent to
copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope
of the federal copyright law. The declaration of this
principle in section 301 is intended to be stated in the
clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to
foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its
unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively,
and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas

reasoning of state seals not expressly being mentioned as copyrightable subject
matter and therefore the Copyright Act did not apply was faulty and incorrect).
137

17 U.S.C. § 105.

138Appellant's Brief at 28, Robart (No. 04-215).
139 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
140 Robart, 82 P.3d at 792.
141 Id.

142 H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746.
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43
between state and federal protection. 1

Therefore, the question the Robart court should have asked is not
whether Congress specifically mentioned state seals, but whether a
state seal fits within one of the categories listed in Section 102.144
D. Referring to State Seals as Trademarks is Improper
The function of trademark laws is to prevent confusion of the
source of goods and services. 145 The relevant Alaska statute does not
sanction deceptive or confusing uses of the seal that falsely imply
official action. 146 If Alaska modified its statute to prohibit deceptive
or confusing uses of the state seal, the statute may be more analogous
to trademark protection. 147 Moreover, the court in Robart stated that
"Alaska statute 44.09.015 does not provide the equivalent of
copyright protection; rather, it provides protection analogous to
trademark protection."' 14 8 Under trademark law, however, state flags
and seals are excluded from protection. 149 Moreover, because there is
no protection for a state seal in trademark law and copyright law
protects a state seal, the statute would therefore be more analogous to
copyright protection.' 50 As a result of this, neither Alaska nor a
private individual would be allowed to register the state seal
as a
trademark and therefore neither would be afforded protection. 15 1
E. Possible Solutions For The Robart-Olde Bradford Dilemma
The Robart court had a legitimate concern in desiring the
14'

H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5746.
'44

Brief for Appellant at 28, Robart (No. 04-215).

141Id.

at 29.

146ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (Michie 2004); See also Robart 82 P.3d at 791

(prohibiting the use of state seal without permission and outlining the resulting
punishments).
147 Brief for Appellant at 29, Robart
(No. 04-215).
14'Robart, 82 P.3d at 793.
149See

Brief for Appellant at 29, Robart (No. 04-215); See also 15 U.S.C. §
1052(b) (2000) (stating that state flags, seals and symbols are excluded from
trademark protection).
150Appellant's Brief at 29, Robart (No. 04-215).
151 Robart, 82 P.3d at 792.
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152
prohibition of commercial use of a symbol of the sovereign state.
A product that bears the state seal gives the impression that the item
was approved by the state, whether or not actual permission was
granted. 53 Protectionist statutes, such as Alaska statute 44.09.015,
that there
are the states' way of approving the product, and assuring
154
is no misuse of state seals in the commercial arena.
On the other hand, there is no remedy to this problem readily
available to the court. Because state seals are copyrightable subject
matter under Section 102, they are protected under federal copyright
laws.' 55 Any state seal protectionist statute is therefore preempted and
would be invalid. 156 Securing the state seal as a trademark is also not
an option because trademark protection does not extend to state flags
and seals.' 57 The only available solution is for Congress to amend the
Copyright Act to include state seals as protected items. Currently,
with no guidance from Congress, indeterminable outcomes for these
statutes will emerge.

V. The Impact of Robart on the Commemorative
Souvenir Industry
A. Adverse Affects of the Robart Ruling
People buy commemorative products as a remembrance of
their vacation or of a historical occasion. After Robart, the
availability of these products might be severely limited as different
states decide to follow either the Robart or Olde Bradford rulings.
The state of Alaska, and other states following Robart, could now
have a controlled monopoly on commemorative products. The state
will now be able to choose who will sell products featuring the state
seal, what kind of product the state seal will be placed on, and how
many products the manufacturer may make that bear the state seal.
All regulation is essentially achieved through royalty agreements or,

152

R.I. Sherman Mfg. Co., 75 N.E. at 72.

i53Id.

154 See ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (2004) (prohibiting use of state seal
without permission and outlining punishments).
155 17 U.S.C. § 102.
156

157

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2000).
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as in the state of Alaska, by obtaining special permission from a
government office.158 The state of Alaska could assign the right to
reproduce the state seal on products to only one private entity or
individual if it chooses. This gives that chosen private entity or
individual an exclusive market to commemorative products in
Alaska, which is unjust and unreasonable given that the state seal has
been in the public domain since its creation.
Moreover, not only will the availability and quantity of
commemorative products be limited, but also the quality and
uniqueness of these products could suffer. There is no guarantee that
the state will grant permission to use the state seal on the highest
quality or most unique product. The state of Alaska now has the
power to promote and exploit this national commerce by authorizing
certain vendors, who make a certain style and quality of product, to
sell their commemorative and souvenir items bearing the state seal.' 59
On the other hand, states realize the importance of this vibrant
market and will not forfeit the substantial revenue that it generates.
Therefore, the states will most likely give permission to every
company that asks for it, as long as the use of the state seal is not
mishandled or misused in anyway. Furthermore, the quality of the
commemorative medallions and other products, such as mugs, shirts,
bells or spoons is not always the essence of the market. Many people
buy low quality commemorative products because it is just that-an
inexpensive souvenir by which to remember the event or occasion.
Nevertheless, some people want to buy special commemorative
products of the very finest and highest quality, and those products
may no longer be available depending on what the state policy is
towards giving permission.
B. Souvenir Business Owners Beware
Vendors of commemorative medallions and other products
enjoyed a certain freedom prior to the Robart decision. 60 Given the
decision in Olde Bradford, the commentary notes and the case law
construing Section 301 of the Copyright Act, vendors did not have to
worry about any risk of criminal penalties for selling commemorative

158

See ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (2004) (prohibiting use of state seal

without permission of the lieutenant governor of Alaska).
159 Appellant's Brief at 21, Robart (No. 04-215).
'60

Id. at 22.
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Today a vendor needs to proceed
medallions bearing state seals.
with caution, or he or she could be assessed with a fine and some
minimal prison time. 162 For example, a vendor can sell Pennsylvania
seal medallions in Pennsylvania but cannot sell Alaska seal
medallions in Alaska.1 6 3 However, Alaska seal medallions can be
because Pennsylvania cannot enforce Alaska's
sold in Pennsylvania
64
laws.'
criminal
Vendors must therefore analyze the statutes of each and every
state to determine if there is a statute requiring permission to sell a
medallion or other product bearing the state seal. 165 Even then, a
vendor has no idea whether the courts in each state will follow the
Pennsylvania court or the Alaska court. This unpredictability will
chill interstate commerce and lead to less production of
products because guessing
commemorative medallions and other
16 6
wrongly leads to criminal penalties.
C. Statutes Ripe For Discrimination and Misuse
Trademark protection does not afford the state of Alaska with
an exclusive property right in its state seal and neither does copyright
protection as the state seal has been in the public domain for many
years. 167 However, because of the Robart decision, Alaska now has
168
an exclusive property right in its state seal when it should not.
Moreover, the state can now license this exclusive property right to
any person or company. 169 There are no guidelines or requirements
that the state of Alaska must follow to issue a license for the state

161 Id.

See ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (stating that a violation of this section is a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $500,
or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both).
162

163 Appellant's
164

Brief at 22, Robert (No. 04-215).

Id.

165 id.

166

id.

167

17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 301; 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

168 See

generally Robart, 82 P.3d at 793 (holding that state seals could be

prohibited from commercial use without the permission of the Lieutenant
Governor's office).
169 See ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.015 (2004) (prohibiting use of state seal
without permission of the lieutenant governor of Alaska).
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seal. 170 Two competing companies could ask the state for permission
to use the state seal, and the state could give the rights to the favored
company only. Discrimination and favoritism could become a large
potential problem when dealing with a statute that gives the
Lieutenant Governor the power to say who does or does not receive
that right to produce. Moreover, it does not give any instructions or
requirements to license the state seal. 71' However, this could be
remedied by amending the statute to give guidelines on how to
distribute these exclusive property rights.
Another inherent problem with this statute is that under the
guise of being a state symbol the state could limit other objects
associated with the state from public and commercial use, even
though these object are already in the public domain and are free for
everyone to use. The question would then become where does the
court draw the line for state symbol protection? This could be
handled by limiting the statute to exact objects such as the state seal,
flag, or coat of arms. However, most statutes are not as specific as the
Alaska statute, which limits it to only the state seal. 172 Some statutes
include state emblems, which can be a hard area to define. Should the
courts make the decision as to what is included as protected state
symbols or defer to the lieutenant governor's office to make the right
decision? These are only some of the questions that are presented
when dealing with a statute that gives unlimited power to a state to
distribute an exclusive property right as it sees fit.

VI.Conclusion
Ultimately, the court's decision in Robart is inconsistent with
173
existing case law and thwarts the goals of federal copyright laws.
Given the fundamentally flawed interpretation of copyright law and a
distinct lack of acknowledgement for a prior case deciding the exact
same area of law, Robart v. Alaska was wrongly decided. This ruling
could be potentially harmful to interstate commerce and the public at
large. Since the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari 1144,
170

See

ALASKA STAT.

§ 44.09.015 (2004) (prohibiting use of state seal

without permission of the lieutenant governor of Alaska).
171 id.
172

Id.

See generally Robart, 82 P.3d at 793 (holding that state seals are not
copyrightable subject matter and not protected by the Copyright Act).
173

174

Robart, 125 S. Ct. at 310.
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both the Alaska state court decision and the Pennsylvania state court
decision stand as good law. 75 Now only time will tell if other state
courts will follow the Alaska state court decision in Robart or the
Pennsylvania state court decision in Olde Bradford.176 Whatever the
decision, Congress' copyright objectives of uniformity and
predictability will be long lost in these decisions.

See Robart, 82 P.3d at 793 (holding there was no copyright preemption of
the Alaska state seal statute); See also Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d at 177 (holding
there was copyright preemption of the Pennsylvania Bicentennial Act).
176 See generally Robart, 82 P.3d at 793 (holding there was no copyright
preemption of the Alaska state seal statute); See also Olde Bradford Co., 365 A.2d
at 177 (holding there was copyright preemption of the Pennsylvania Bicentennial
Act).
175

